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That demonstratives often have endophoric functions marking referents outside the
physical space of interaction but accessible through cognition, especially memory, is
well-known. These functions are often classified as independent from exophoric ones
and are typically seen as secondary with respect to spatial deixis. However, data
from multiple languages show that cognitive access to referents functions alongside
of perceptual access, including vision. Cognitive access is enabled by prior interactions
and prior familiarity with the referents. As a result of such interactions, the interlocutors
share a great deal of knowledge about the referents, which facilitates reference to
objects in the interactive field. The centrality of common ground in reference to an object
at the interactive scene challenges the often assumed classification of demonstrative
reference into exophoric and endophoric. I illustrate this idea throughout the paper
by using first-hand data from Mano, a Mande language of Guinea. Adding another
argument in favor of viewing demonstrative reference as a social, interactive process, the
Mano data push the idea of salience of non-spatial parameters further and emphasizes
the importance of short and long-term interactional history and cultural knowledge both
for the choice of demonstratives in exophoric reference and for the structuring of the
demonstrative paradigm.
Keywords: deixis, common ground, reference, ethnography, interaction, interactional history, corpus, Mande
languages
INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that the exophoric reference to objects in the physical space
of interaction is more basic than the endophoric reference used to track referents
in discourse or in reference to discourse itself (Diessel, 1999; Levinson et al., 2018).
Much scholarly attention has been directed to the exophoric use using a targeted
elicitation methodology (i.e., Coventry et al., 2014; Wilkins, 2018). In such studies,
interaction participants are only given the very lean and abstract characteristics of
“speaker” and “addressee.” Yet such an approach obscures the fact that participants in
Abbreviations: ADR, addressee; ASSOC, associative plural; ATT, attention drawing; BKGR, backgrounding marker; COND,
conditional; CONJ, conjunctive; COP, copula; DEM, demonstrative; DIST, distal; EMPH, emphatic; EXI, existential; FR, French;
GER, gerund; H, high tone; INDEF, indefinite; INF, infinitive; INJ, interjection; INT, intensifier; IPFV, imperfective; JNT, conjoint;
NEG, negative; PL, plural; POSS, possessive; PRF, perfect; PROH, prohibitive; PST, past; REFL, reflexive; REL, relativizer; SBJV,
subjunctive; SG, singular.
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real-life speech events come to any particular interaction with
a set of expectations and background knowledge. This fact
challenges the standard classification of demonstrative functions
that contrasts exophoric and endophoric uses (on that point,
see also Agha, 1996)1. Indeed, a referent physically present at
the interactive scene often belongs both to the deictic sphere of
interaction and to the non-deictic sphere of common ground
which includes the participants’ mutual knowledge, beliefs and
suppositions (Clark et al., 1983). As argued by Coventry et al.
(2014, p. 49), “the perception of space is not constrained
solely by the characteristics of the physical environment, but
is mediated by high-level knowledge about the objects being
perceived.” In this paper, by using first-hand, to a large extent
previously unpublished data from Mano (Mande, Guinea), I
extend this important conclusion by arguing that such mixed
endophoric-exophoric uses cannot be accounted for unless one
sees interactants as social actors and interaction as loaded with
history (Hanks, 1990, 2005).
Let us compare two examples from Mano. In (1) the speaker is
sitting side by side with the addressee on a sofa. The addressee
is reading a book, occasionally using sticky notes to markup
pages. The package of sticky notes referred to in (1) by using
the demonstrative t c̀c̄is placed between the interlocutors. It has,
perhaps, never been seen before in the household in question (it
is not named but is referred to by a 3sg pronoun) and has not
been discussed previously. The interlocutors were not attending
the referent in a joint activity: in fact, the addressee’s attention
is focused on the book rather than on the sticky notes. For
this reason the speaker makes a pointing gesture, which helps
her secure the addressee’s visual attention to the referent with
the first attempt.
(1)
áyē t c̀c̄ l ÉÈ lō ñĒ-È ñÉÈ?
3SG.EMPH DEM.ATT 3SG.IPFV go:IPFV finish-GER isn’t.it
“This one is going to finish, right?” [Mano, own fieldnotes].
In (2) a young street vendor is addressing two persons passing
by about 1.5 m away on a motorbike. The two motorbike riders
are engaged in a conversation, so they were not attending the
referent before it was mentioned. The vendor is suggesting they
buy popcorn balls, a very popular snack found on many corners
of Mano villages and towns, something the interlocutors are
surely used to and expect to see. For this reason no visual
attention is required. Moreover, precisely because she expects the
addressees to be familiar with the referent (which is also marked
with the possessive pronoun kà “your”) and because it is difficult
to draw the addressees’ visual attention, the speaker chooses the
wĒ demonstrative.
1Diessel (1999) divides endophoric demonstrative use into four subfunctions:
anaphora (I saw a guy yesterday, that guy was clearly following me), cataphora
(let me tell you this simple trick), recognitional (as in Internet memes: that feeling
when), and discourse deictic [the moral of that story (just been told)]. Levinson
(2004) proposes a different classification, dividing demonstratives into two use-
types, deictic (including exophoric, but also discourse deictic) and non-deictic,
which includes recognitional, cataphoric and anaphoric uses plus the emphatic use
(that son of a bitch!).
(2)
kà kpÈí wĒ l c̀ wĒ!
2PL.POSS corn DEM1 buy DEM1
“Your popcorn (lit.: this corn of yours), buy it!” [Mano,
own fieldnotes].
The choice between the demonstratives t c̀c̄and wĒ is not
motivated by the differences in physical distance between the
speaker and the object: in both cases the object is located
within the arm’s reach (on a sofa next to the speaker or
on a stand). The position in the interactional sequence also
does not appear to matter: both (1) and (2) concern first
mentions of referents in a given interaction. Instead, the choice
is motivated by the degree of prior familiarity with and the
existence of shared knowledge about the referent. The Mano
exophoric demonstratives t ćc̄(and d~ì ~̄a) indicate that additional
visual attention coordination is required in order to identify
the referent and for this reason they are typically accompanied
by deictic pointing, as in (1). In contrast, the demonstratives
wĒ (and yā), which may be used exophorically, as in (2), or
endophorically, do not encode such a requirement. Although
they may be used for establishing joint visual attention, they are
also (and even more frequently) used in situations where such
visual attention coordination is already established or where it
is impossible or unnecessary, when the speaker has reasons to
believe that the referent is salient enough for the purposes at
hand. In these situations, referent identification is primarily based
on the interlocutors’ mutual knowledge of the referent, which is




Demonstratives are linguistic expressions serving “to coordinate
the interlocutors’ joint focus of attention” on a reference
object (Diessel, 2006, p. 464). The physical co-presence of
interlocutors is understood as the prototypical property of
interactional settings, and coordination of attention on objects
in space is considered the primary function of demonstratives,
primordial in phylogeny (Tomasello, 2008), best described in
the literature (Levinson et al., 2018) and also seen as the source
of further functional development and grammaticalization of
non-spatial, endophoric functions (anaphora, discourse deixis,
recognitional function, see Diessel, 1999). Even synchronically,
anaphora is sometimes seen as a metaphoric extension of space
(Anderson and Keenan, 1985).
A considerable volume of ethnographic and experimental
research on demonstratives has shown that spatial distinctions
cannot be reduced to mere physical distance. Natural, artificial,
and culturally imposed boundaries (rivers, valleys, island
boundaries; walls; family spaces, boundaries of the village) also
contribute to the conceptualization of the proximity vs. distance
contrast (as in this village, which can cover quite an extensive
space, Margetts, 2018, see also Hanks, 1990; Enfield, 2003). In
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other words, in formulation and interpretation of demonstrative
reference, the speakers engage with a great deal of knowledge
about the social world and the space they inhabit is not
merely physical but interactional. Thus, in Lao, the choice of
demonstrative in a two-part system is determined by the position
of the referent with respect to the interactionally defined here-
space of the speaker (Enfield, 2003).
In addition to the knowledge about the space of interaction,
in real-world interactional settings the referents themselves
do not appear as timeless artifacts, as is often the case in
experimental studies, but are loaded with history. On one level,
the establishment of joint attention and referent identification
are parts of an interactive process (Hindmarsh and Heath,
2000; Eriksson, 2009; Etelämäki, 2009). Several languages have
been attested where demonstratives encode different stages in
that process. Thus, in addition to the speaker-centric spatial
distinction between a proximal and a distal demonstrative,
another core semantic distinction in the Turkish demonstrative
paradigm is whether the referent is in the addressee’s focus of
attention (Küntay and Özyürek, 2006). Such cases concern the
history of a given interaction within several interactional turns
(see section “Common Ground and Interactional History”).
On a further level, as argued by Clark et al. (1983), reference
resolution can be predicated on mutual knowledge built in
long-term local histories of interaction, stretching beyond the
interaction at hand. Thus, as the authors argue, the local history
of interaction plays a role when a speaker points to a group of
men and says “That is what George will look like very soon”: the
reference is interpretable upon a condition that something has
been said between the two interlocutors about George, e.g., that
he is gaining or losing too much weight, and that one of the men
in the group looks overweight or underweight. Thus, meaning
and reference are established in time, as part of incremental
building of common ground within and across interactional
encounters (Deppermann, 2018; Harjunpää et al., 2021).
A further level of complexity arises when interaction
participants are not seen as merely speaker and addressee
engaged in interaction, but as cultural beings who, by virtue
of their membership in a particular collectivity (community
of practice, speech community), operate with a great deal of
common knowledge. Such culturally shared knowledge, which
is (presumably) available to most if not all members of a given
collectivity, became apparent as a determiner in an experiment
discussed in Clark et al. (1983), where the subjects were shown
a photograph of President Reagan and David Stockman, then
the director of the Office of Management and Budget. When
asked, “You know who this man is, don’t you?” the overwhelming
majority of subjects understood “this man” to be Reagan, not
Stockman, who was much less known. Furthermore, interaction
participants are also social actors engaged in specific partially
scripted social activities. Such activities presuppose a specific
optic through which some objects are seen and a specific way
they are referred to Hindmarsh and Heath (2000). In particular,
even when objects are referred to for the first time in a given
interaction, they may be partially anticipated. For example, in
Yucatec Maya, a shaman wrapping up a medicine for his patient
may refer to it using a non-immediate deictic, despite the fact
that the referent is immediately accessible, which would in other
contexts warrant the use of an immediate deictic. This use, as
Hanks (2005) explains, is in part because the referent, a medicine,
is presented as mutually known and expected in the context
of shamanic practice and such uses are typically covered by a
non-immediate deictic.
A given referential act is thus part of different mutually
constituting levels. On the one hand, it belongs to the level
of the temporarily unfolding interactional process of reference
resolution, which in turn is part of a longer-term interactional
history involving the same communicating individuals. On the
other hand, these individuals participate in communication not
only as communicating agents, but also as social agents occupying
different positions in social fields (Bourdieu, 1990) routinely
dealing with and talking about specific kinds of artifacts. In
other words, any given interaction is embedded in (Hanks, 2005),
and is an instantiation of, a social field whereby the properties
and the relationships between the positions in the social field
are projected onto a very general structure of the interactional
space. Thus, the properties and relationships in the triad shaman–
patient–medicine is projected onto a given triad of speaker,
addressee and referent and motivates the choice of the referential
expression. Both kinds of embedding, embedding in interactional
history and in social fields, transform referents in the interactive
space from physical to social artifacts known to the interactants:
while short- and long-term interactional history provides situated
knowledge to given participants, the social field provides more
general knowledge available to wider collectivities participating
in the same social field.
The following discussion is organized in the following way.
Section “Mano Demonstrative System” presents four Mano
demonstratives as they are used in naturally occurring referential
acts. Section “ Demonstratives kpÈí and d~ì ~̄a” offers some basic
morphosyntactic information on the four Mano demonstratives.
Section “Demonstratives wĒ and yā” presents the functions
of the demonstratives t ćc̄and tÉ d~ì ~̄a in more detail. Section
“Demonstratives wĒ And yā” is dedicated to the demonstratives
wĒ and yā, their endophoric (discourse reference, anaphora
and recognitional function) and exophoric functions, as well
as the contrasts between the two markers. Section Semantics
and Pragmatics of Mano Demonstratives is an interim summary
where I disentangle the semantic and pragmatic components
of the meaning of Mano demonstratives. Section “Common
Ground and Reference Resolution in Interaction” presents the
demonstratives wĒ and yā in a broader interactional context
which provides the interaction participants with knowledge
about referents and motivates the use of wĒ and yā. Section
“Common Ground and Interactional History” illustrates the
interactional process of referent identification and the role
of idiosyncratic mutual knowledge built in local interactions,
in particular, between friends and family members. Section
“Common Ground and Social Fields” deals with knowledge
proper to specific social fields, namely the domain of ritual
practice (“traditional” and Christian) and specificities of
demonstrative reference proper to these domains. I discuss the
findings in section “Discussion” and make my conclusions in
section “Conclusion.”
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MANO DEMONSTRATIVE SYSTEM
Mano (mááwè) is a Southern Mande language spoken by
305,000 people in Liberia (Ethnologue2) and, according to
different estimations, by 66,000 (Guinean census performed
in 2014, Bah and Bangoura, 2017) and 95,000 (Ethnologue) in
Guinea. A grammar of Mano can be found in Khachaturyan
(2015), and for a typological portrait of the language, see
Khachaturyan (2020a). The demonstrative system is subject to
dialectal variation; for a preliminary account, see Khachaturyan
(2018a). Despite the widespread multilingualism, Mano is
well-preserved and well-transmitted to children; (quasi)-
monolingual repertoires have also been attested (Khachaturyan
and Konoshenko, forthcoming).
Mano, just like other Mande languages, is a largely isolating
language. It has a fixed S-Aux-O-V-X word order, where
Aux is an auxiliary inflected for person and number and
agreesing with the subject, and X is any post-verbal argument
expressed by a postpositional phrase. With three tonal levels,
it has quite a large number of tonal morphemes but a
relatively small inventory of segmental morphemes. Thus,
besides very minimal derivational morphology, the only two
inflectional nominal forms are the low-tone construct form
(CSTR), appearing on the head of noun phrases with specific
kinds of preposed dependents, and a high-tone form (H) used
with demonstratives. Definiteness is not grammaticalized in the
language, and although certain grammatical markers take on
the functions of marking definiteness, they are never obligatory
(Khachaturyan, 2020b).
This paper is based on the data from the Central Guinean
dialect of Mano, Maa (máá), drawn from a corpus of recordings
of spontaneous speech collected by the author during more
than 15 months of fieldwork. All the examples taken from
the Mano oral corpus are marked with MOC. Some examples
come from fieldnotes [fieldnotes]: these are utterances that I
overheard and noted and then asked the consultant to comment
on them and, if necessary, correct. A minor fraction of examples
are elicited (el.). All elicited utterances were contextualized
and discussed with the primary language consultant. Whenever
applicable, square brackets [] indicate exact discourse context
preceding or following the utterance in question, parenthesis ()
indicate a summary of the preceding or following context or
provide other textual commentaries. No systematic questionnaire
study of exophoric use has been conducted, which represents
a major limitation of the present study. However, since the
focus of the paper is the role of common ground in reference
resolution, some of which is acquired in interaction between
specific individuals (inhabitants of the same village, or family
members), the observational data are adequate for the analysis.
The Maa dialect of Mano (I will use Mano as a shortcut in the
subsequent discussion) has four adnominal demonstratives used
for exophoric reference: t c̀c̄, d~ì ~̄a, wĒ∼áĒ∼wāā and yā∼ā∼yāā.
Pronominal demonstratives are formed by adding tÉ or yé (or
only yé, in case of t c̀c̄) to the demonstrative stem: t c̀c̄∼yét c̀c̄, tÉd~ì ~̄a,
tÉā∼yéā and tÉwĒ∼yéwĒ. They are assumed to be extensionally
2https://www.ethnologue.com/language/mev/23
equivalent to the respective pronominal demonstratives and are
occasionally mentioned in the paper (ex. 16). The demonstrative
adverbs used in the language are: zèē “here,” d~ì~̄ı “there, distal”
(which d~ì ~̄a derives from), and yı̄ “there, anaphoric.” They are not
discussed in this article.
The demonstrative d~ì ~̄a is obligatorily preceded by the marker
of attention alignment tÉ∼lÉ. For the demonstratives wĒ and
yā the marker is optional. The demonstrative t c̀c̄does not allow
the marker of attention alignment, so combinations like tÉ t c̀c̄
or lÉ t c̀c̄do not occur in the corpus and are disallowed in
elicitation. This is most likely because it historically derives from
a fusion between tÉ and the demonstrative wĒ3. As is shown in
the discussion of the semantics and pragmatics of these markers,
the additional attention alignment effort is what distinguishes the
typical contexts of use of the demonstratives t ćc̄and d~ì ~̄a, on the
one hand, and wĒ and yā, on the other.
Mano also has the demonstratives kílíwĒ and kílíā, which are
used exclusively for reference tracking. Given their limited scope
and the fact that they are not used for exophoric reference, I
will not discuss them further. In addition, Mano has a marker of
bridging, à, which, in contrast with the demonstratives, is situated
prenominally and is not part of the demonstrative paradigm
(Khachaturyan, 2020b).
Table 1 presents the Mano demonstrative forms. The five
forms (excluding the free variants) differ in the domain of use
(exophoric only) for t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a; exophoric and endophoric (and
simultaneously exophoric and endophoric) for wĒ and yā; and
endophoric only for kílíáĒ and kílíā. Further contrasts between
the two pairs of forms, t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a, on the one hand, and wĒ
and yā, on the other, will be discussed in the following sections.
The contrast between kílíáĒ and kílíā should be an object of
further investigation.
Demonstratives tɔ́ɔ̄ and dı̰̀ā̰ 
The demonstrative t c̀c̄ is used exclusively in the exophoric
function to refer to objects present at the interactive scene; the
act of reference is typically accompanied by a pointing gesture.
In (3), the speaker is telling about his motorbike accident and is
showing schematically on the ground where he was when the car
hit him and how the car approached him.
(3)
bon, à g~à dōó gb ~̀E- ~̀E l̄E l̀E t c̀c̄ m ć.
well[FR] 3SG leg one put-GER COP place DEM.ATT on
3Fusion is commonly present in Mano, especially in fast speech. However, t c̀c̄is
used even in very slow and articulate speech; moreover, the fusion resulting in
change of vowel quality (tÉ + wĒ = t ćc̄) is not so frequently attested in Mano. For
these reasons, I consider t c̀c̄to be a separate demonstrative marker, rather than a
combination of tÉ and wĒ.
TABLE 1 | Adnominal demonstratives in Mano.
Exophoric t ´c̄c
d~ì ~̄a
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“[Here is the asphalted part of the road.] So one of its wheels
is here (pointing to the ground, at the edge of the asphalted
part). [He is behind me, he looks like he’s going to stop (at the
side road)]” (MOC).
The demonstrative is speaker-anchored, which is evidenced by
situations where the referent is invisible and inaccessible to the
interlocutor, being relatively far away and in a different room (4).
(4)
mı̄̄ı t c̀c̄ à yímÈ pÉnĒĒ!
person DEM.ATT 3SG beat today
(Referring to his son who has just entered the room where he
is sitting a man shouts outside to his wife:) “This guy (the boy),
scold him today!” [fieldnotes].
The proximity of the referent to the speaker is flexible and
not limited to the peripersonal space: while in (3), the object
is within arm’s reach, in (4) it is about two meters away. My
Mano interlocutors often introduce new people to me by pointing
and saying mı̄̄ı t c̀c̄“this person” is such and such. The persons
introduced can be at a considerable distance from me. What
matters is that they are clearly visible and easily identifiable.
The demonstrative d~ì ~̄a is used very rarely and I have only
a few instances in my notes. It derives from a fusion of the
deictic adverb d~ì~̄ı “there” with the marker ā4. Similarly to t c̀c̄,
the demonstrative d~ì ~̄a is used in the exophoric function, typically
with a pointing gesture. While the preferred situation is where
the object is visible, d~ì ~̄a can occur with invisible objects that the
speaker can locate with certainty (5, 6).
(5)
là s c̄ lÉ d~ì ~̄a, kà sí
3SG.POSS cloth ATT DEM.ATT.DIST 2PL.SBJV take
ká nū à ká!
2PL.CONJ come 3SG with
(The speaker is sitting on the floor, pointing to a basket
on the opposite side of the room, about three meters away,
asking her grandchild to bring her the clothes of another
grandchild). “Those clothes of his, you (pl.) take them and bring
them!” [fieldnotes].
(6)
mÉŋ̀ tÉ ē d~ì ~̄a, l̄E
something ATT 3SG.REFL DEM.ATT.DIST 3SG.EXI
ké, kàkò lō pÉnĒĒ,
like.this 1PL.SBJV go:IPFV today
kó ló à vùò áō-à.
1PL.CONJ go 3SG greeting do-GER
4Given that d~ì ~̄a is always used with a marker of attention alignment, which is also
used to introduced relativized NPs (Khachaturyan and Ozerov, in preparation) and
that ā is used to frame the right edge of relative clauses, d~ì ~̄a is interpretable both as
an adnominal determiner “that X” and as part of a complex utterance of the type
“X that is there.”
(An imaginary discussion between two inhabitants of the
same village). “That guy over there (in the village, distance
undetermined, may be visible, preferred interpretation, or
invisible) is such (in such a state), let’s go today, let’s go and
greet him” [MOC].
For both t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a the distance between the speaker and the
referent can vary. There is an overlap in the distance measures in
t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a: in (4) with t c̀c̄and (5) with d~ì ~̄a the distance is roughly
the same. See also (7a), (7b) illustrating that both demonstratives
are acceptable in certain contexts.
(7)
a. y c̄ t c̀c̄ l̄E nÉ ŋ́n Èŋ̀.
wine DEM.ATT 3SG.EXI sweet
Situation A (The interlocutors sit one facing the other on
opposite sides of the room, about 3 m away. The speaker is
holding a can of beer in his hand). “This beer is good.”
Situation B (Same as above. The addressee is holding a can of
beer in his hand. The speaker points to it and says). “This beer is
good.”
Situation C (The interlocutors sit side by side. Either of them
holds a can of beer in his hand). “This beer is good.”
b. y c̄ lÉ d~ì ~̄a l̄E nÉ ŋ́n Èŋ̀.
wine ATT DEM.ATT.DIST 3SG.EXI sweet
Situation A (The interlocutors sit one facing the other on
opposite sides of the room, about 3 m away. The addressee is
holding a can of beer in his hand). “That beer is good.”
Situation B (The interlocutors sit side by side, the beer is
located on the other side of the room, about 3 m away). “That
beer is good.”
∗The utterance is ungrammatical in a situation where the
speaker is holding a can of beer in his hand [el.].
Just like t c̀c̄, d~ì ~̄a is a speaker-centered marker, since the location
of the addressee does not affect its use (7a, 7b). In contrast with
t c̀c̄, d~ì ~̄a is never used to refer to objects in the peripersonal space
(7b) and can be used with objects significantly further away from
the speaker (6). Crucially, the spatial setting, the ongoing activity
and the purpose of pointing may matter (although more examples
are needed to confirm this). In (5), with d~ì ~̄a, the object is located
on the other side of the room. The speaker is sitting on the
floor, the object is clearly out of reach and she is instructing her
granddaughter to fetch the object—clothes—for her so that she
could dress her newborn grandson. Thus, d~ì ~̄a is used with objects
which are not immediately accessible to the speaker by being
outside of her engagement area defined as “the place which is,
at moment t, the conceived site of a person’s currently dominant
manual and attentional engagement” (Enfield, 2003, p. 89). In
contrast, t c̀c̄is neutral in that regard: it can be used with referents
both within (3, 7a, Situation A, see also 26.1 below) and outside
(4, 7b, Situation B) the engagement area.
Demonstratives wĒ and yā
The demonstrative wĒ, which also has the variants áĒ and
wāā, and yā, which has the variants ā and yāā, can be
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used in all functions suggested by Himmelmann (1996) and
Diessel (1999). They are very common in endophoric functions:
referring to discourse itself (section “Discourse Reference”),
reference tracking and anaphora (section “Anaphora”), or the
recognitional function where the speaker assumes that the
referent is identifiable for the interlocutor without prior mention
(section “Recognitional Function”)5. Both demonstratives can
also be used in the exophoric function, referring to objects
present at the interactive scene (section “Exophoric Function:
Indexing Familiarity”). They fulfill very similar functions to
each other, and are very frequently interchangeable; I will
gloss them as DEM1 and DEM2, respectively. I will begin with
endophoric functions and then continue with the exophoric
one, in which they contrast not only with each other, but
also with the demonstratives t c̀c̄ and d~ì ~̄a analyzed in the
previous section.
Discourse Reference
The discourse referential function is not so frequently found in
texts, but both demonstratives can be used in that function. The
choice between them seems to be a matter of personal and/or
dialectal preferences.
(8)
áá gèá áà nÉ l̀EĒ,
2SG.CONJ>3SG say.COND 2SG.POSS child ADR
ŋw c̀ yé t c̀c̄ kĒ
problem REL DEM.ATT do
é ı̄ wéè yā áÈl̄E yà
3SG.CONJ 2SG speech DEM2 respect place
ā, kĒ āà ı̄ kĒ gb c̀kò.
BKGR then 3SG.PRF 2SG do big
“If you say to your child: do this thing so that he pays respect
to that speech of yours, (if he does so) then (it means that) he
has honored you” [MOC].
(9)
mı̄̄ı lÉ ā gèē ı̄ l̀EĒ?
person ATT 3SG.PST>3SG say 2SG ADR
~́E~́E ŋw c̀ wĒ áā sí ı̄
and problem DEM1 2SG.PST>3SG take 2SG
dìè gé?
INT stomach
“[Pons Pilate said to Jesus: Man, is it you who are the king of
Jews? And then he asked] Was it someone who told it to you? Or
did you invent that issue (that you are the king of Jews) yourself
(lit.: took that problem from your own stomach)?” [MOC].
Anaphora
In the anaphoric function, both demonstratives are widely used
and seem to be interchangeable. Yā and wĒ were attested in all
speech genres available in our corpus, both monological ones
(folktales, 10 and 11) or conversations (26).
5My corpus lacks examples of the cataphoric reference fulfilled with
demonstratives.
(10)
kélé nì lÉ āà dà áĒ,
shed ASSOC ATT 3SG.PRF fall BKGR
tó kélé áĒ áàá là kĒ.
so shed DEM1 2SG.NEG>3SG surface do
“Even the shed that has fallen, that shed, you don’t repair
its roof” [MOC].
Example (11) is taken from a story about three hunters. The
prior mention of the same referent with a 3pl pronoun occurred
in the preceding clause.
(11)
ō yààkā yā wáà lò wà lúú
3PL three DEM2 3PL.JNT go:JNT 3PL.POSS bush
píé kĒ-È.
to do-GER
“[The story I want to tell concerns three hunters... Every month
they go and hunt together very well]. The three of them, they
went hunting” [MOC].
Recognitional Function
Both yā and wĒ are particularly common in the recognitional
function when they are used to refer to objects not present at the
interactive scene, but are accessible via the common ground of
the interlocutors (on that function in Mano, see Khachaturyan,
2019). Thus in example (12) both tòò “tomorrow” and áū “rice”
refer to entities made recognizable by a prior arrangement.
“Everybody knows that I have to go tomorrow to my field to
work,” the speaker told me when I asked her to comment on her
usage of the demonstrative in (12).
(12)
tòò yā, kóò lō áú yā
tomorrow DEM2 1PL.IPFV go:IPFV rice:H DEM2
mÈ-È.
beat-GER
“That tomorrow, we will beat that rice” [fieldnotes].
(13)
áà ordinateur wĒ, à sí wĒ!
2SG.POSS laptop[FR] DEM1 3SG take DEM1
(An imagined conversation, where the speaker advises his
addressee not to forget to take her laptop on the trip). “This
laptop of yours, take it!” [el].
Exophoric Function: Indexing Familiarity
In the corpus wĒ does not seem to show any clear preference.
Example (2 above) was used with a referent close by, about 1.5 m
away, while example (14) was used with a referent further away.
(14)
áà l̀E wĒ g ~̀E è
2SG.POSS field DEM1 COP.DEICT 3SG.SBJV
lō wē.
go:IPFV EXI
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(An old man is showing, with a pointing gesture, to his
daughter-in-law the placement and the direction of expanse of
a field that he offered her and her husband). “Here is this
field of yours (stretching to some 100 meters), it goes like
this” [fieldnotes].
In (15), a woman instructs her brother-in-law to burn the
feathers of a duck she is going to cook. The fireplace is some
eight meters away from where she is sitting and is hidden
behind a shed. I did not take a proper note of the position of
her interlocutor.
(15)
Pèé í ñĒ-É gbāā,
P.N. 2SG.CONJ finish:COND-COND now>BKGR
í tíé yā mÉŋ̀
2SG.CONJ fire DEM2 something
kĒ, áá mÉŋ̀ kĒ!
do 2SG.CONJ>3SG something do
“Pe, when you have finished, do the thing with that fire, do
the thing!” [fieldnotes].
In (16) the speaker is sitting at a table with his friend, eating
dinner (with hands, as is customary among Mano). His wife
approaches him from behind asking whether he has seen the
charger to her phone, which she is holding in her hand. His
response is given in (16). His hands are busy with eating, but he
does not even need to point, he merely takes a quick look at her
phone as he knows the model very well.
(16)
non-non-non, à dò wÉı̄. tÉā
no[FR] 3SG INDEF NEG.COP>there DEM2
là chargeur dò w c̀
3SG.POSS charger[FR] INDEF COP.NEG
kō kÈl̀E zèē.
1PL hand here
“[Do you(pl.) have a charger here?]” “No, we don’t. That (thing),
we don’t have its charger here.”
The demonstratives wĒ and yā may be used when either the
speaker or both interlocutors do not see the referent. In (17), the
speaker is riding on a motorcycle with the addressee and reminds
his addressee to take the laptop, among other things, from a




“The laptop (we are approaching the charging
station)!” [fieldnotes].
Similarly, when I was discussing example (4) with my
language consultant and asked what demonstrative form would
be chosen if the boy were outside the house with his mother and
the speaker inside, the consultant suggested the demonstrative
yā, instead of t c̀c̄(18).
(18)
míí yā, à yímÈ pÉnĒĒ!
person:H DEM2 3SG beat today
(A boy went into a puddle and came home dirty. He is outside
the house with his mother, whom the father is addressing from
inside the house). “That guy, scold him today!” [el].
Both wĒ and yā can be used to attract the addressee’s attention
to the referents which were not discussed in the prior discourse
(2). And yet, in contrast with t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a, typically the speaker
expects some existing familiarity with the referents, even when
the demonstratives are used exophorically. In (15) the instruction
of the speaker is very vague, “do the thing with the fire,” which
means that they had already discussed the issue or that the
addressee is used to those kinds of chores. In (14), there had
clearly been some prior discussion of the field in the family. The
old man is just showing his daughter-in-law where the field is
before they start some bush clearing work. In (2), the speaker is
a street vendor selling a very widespread Mano snack—popcorn
balls. Prior familiarity with the object is what allows wĒ and yā
to be used with invisible objects or objects to which it is difficult
to draw the interlocutor’s attention if (s)he is busy with other
things: such as riding a motorbike (2). Likewise, the speaker
may be limited in her or his capacity to clearly point: because
she is cooking (15) or eating (16), but pointing is typically not
essential in reference retrieval. The demonstratives wĒ and yā are
especially common in the anaphoric and recognitional functions,
which rely on the cognitive accessibility of the referents alone
without any clues from the physical context.
wĒ Vs. yā
In the real-life examples provided above, there is no clear
tendency for the distance between the referent framed with the
demonstratives wĒ and yā and the deictic center. In elicitation,
however, objects framed with wĒ are presented as close to
the speaker, while objects framed with yā are presented as
further away. In (19a), repeated from 17, the speaker reminds
his addressee to take the laptop, among other things, from a
charging station. They were approaching it on a motorcycle and
were already rather close, at the entrance to the town, so the
speaker used wĒ. A contrasting example (19b), which would
have been used had they been further away on the road, is with yā.
(19)
a. ordinateur nì wĒ!
laptop[FR] ASSOC DEM1
“The laptop (we are approaching the charging
station!)” [fieldnotes].
b. ordinateur nì yā!
laptop[FR] ASSOC DEM2
“The laptop! (don’t forget to pick it up when we pass by)” [el].
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A similar contrast in the degree of familiarity may also affect
the use of wĒ and yā. In (20), the demonstrative wāā (a variant
of wĒ) is used to refer to a woman that the addressee has just
met for the first time at the local hospital, so she is highly salient
in the context. In contrast, the woman’s husband, whom the
addressee has never met but whose existence she may very well
infer, given that the woman in question had just given birth to a
child, is framed with the demonstrative yā. Both referents are out
of sight and were not talked about in the prior conversation, but
the woman is more familiar to the addressee than her husband.
Note that here the speaker takes the addressee’s perspective in
evaluating the referent’s relative familiarity.
(20)
léé wāā, léé áā g~̀E
woman:H DEM1 woman:H 2SG.PST>3SG see
y ććt c̄l ć pàà wāā,
doctor at BKGR
à d~̄E yā, D ćmà zíé l̄E.
3SG husband DEM2 P.N. uncle COP
“That woman, that woman that you saw at the hospital, that
husband of hers, he is Doma’s uncle” [fieldnotes].
In Mano, physical accessibility and engagement affects the use
of t c̀c̄vs. d~ì ~̄a. The difference between wĒ and yā is not yet clear
from the data, but it is possible that a similar contrast is at play
where engagement is seen in a more abstract way as a sphere of
ownership, control, familiarity or mental preoccupation.
The objects referred to in (21) are expected to be served to
the speaker by the addressee in the situation that the utterance
describes. Therefore, although the referents are known to both
parties in the interaction, which motivates the recognitional
function, they belong to the sphere of the assumed control and
possession of the speaker, so wĒ is chosen over yā.
(21)
kĒ ékÈ ó nū à gèē à
so.that PROH 3PL.CONJ come 3SG say 3SG
l̀EĒ, nū y c̄ áĒ ká,
ADR come wine DEM1 with
nū pĒ yé áĒ ká, ē wàà.
come thing REL DEM1 with 3SG.PST enter
(A man’s mother and father died, but he did not have
money to organize their funerals). “So that people don’t come
saying: “Bring this wine, bring this thing” (the food and the
drinks that invitees at a funeral are expected to be served), he
ran away” [MOC].
Example (22) is from my notes of my consultant’s children
commenting on pictures in a comic book. The children at that
time were not fluent in French, so they could not read what
was actually written in the word balloons and instead staged
an imagined conversation between the book’s characters. The
characters played with the referent (the ball) together and had
equal access to the information in question.
(22)
kóò lō dèèkpō yā ŋwÉŋ̀l ćc̄
1PL.IPFV go:IPFV ball DEM2 question
kĒ-È.
do-GER
(Children were playing with a ball and accidentally threw it to
the other side of the neighbor’s fence. They are deciding among
themselves what to do with the ball). “We will ask about that
ball” [fieldnotes].
Example (23) is taken from a conversation between
relatives, two sisters-in-law, but it is the addressee who is
more knowledgeable about the whereabouts of the referent,
her children.
(23)
māē, ŋ̄ kĒ à gèē-pÈl̀E,
1SG.EMPH 1SG.PST be 3SG say-INF
áà n c̀c̄áé v ć yāā séŋ́ ō
2SG.POSS child.PL PL DEM2 all 3PL.EXI
nū-pÈl̀E.
come-INF
(A woman is talking to her sister-in-law, who came to
celebrate the New Year with her, having brought only some of
her children with her). “As for me, I thought that all of those
children of yours were coming” [MOC].
Thus, the contrast between the demonstratives wĒ and yā
implies the contrast in the engagement with the referent,
where wĒ covers the engagement sphere of the speaker
and yā is used for the common sphere or the addressee’s
sphere. The contrast emerges from prior interactions and
expectations that the interlocutors have: who owns and controls
what (children, food served to a guest), what business is
a matter of common concern, and what is taken as a
personal matter.
Semantics and Pragmatics of Mano
Demonstratives
As argued above, the contrast within the two pairs of
demonstratives, t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a, and wĒ and yā, is motivated by the
factor of the engagement sphere: d~ì ~̄a is used for referents outside
the engagement sphere of the speaker and t c̀c̄is neutral in that
regard, while wĒ is used for referents within the engagement
sphere of the speaker and yā is neutral. In the case of the former
pair, engagement is understood in the sense of Enfield (2003)
as an area of physical activity. In the case of the latter pair,
engagement is seen in a more abstract way as an area of one’s
expertise, familiarity or control (see Evans et al., 2018).
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The referents of the noun phrase framed with t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a
are objects that, as a rule, were not mentioned in the discussion
immediately prior to the act of reference. Usually there is extra
work needed to establish joint visual attention to the referent.
The attention management marker tÉ∼lÉ that is obligatorily
used with d~ì ~̄a and that is likely embedded in the form of t c̀c̄
informs the addressee that she needs to align her attention with a
non-trivial referent (Khachaturyan and Ozerov, in preparation).
Gesture becomes a key means of securing joint attention and
establishing reference and usually accompanies noun phrases
with the demonstratives t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a.
In contrast, the common feature of all uses of wĒ and yā
listed above is that the referents are easily identifiable given
the common ground of the interlocutors. And yet they are also
compatible with deictic gesture, as shown in (14), and, more
importantly, with the marker of attention alignment. Example
(24) is taken from a spontaneous translation of Luke 9:35, where
God announces that Jesus is his son and is chosen by him. Note
that God is speaking from a cloud, which complicates reference
resolution and triggers the use of the attention management
marker. However, given the unusual circumstances of the
referential act, no pointing is possible, so neither t ćc̄nor d~ì ~̄a is
possible in this context.
(24)
mí tÉ yā, l̄E ŋ̀ nÉ
person:H ATT DEM2 3SG.EXI 1SG.POSS child
ká.
with
“That person, he is my Son” [MOC].
The attention management marker may be used to accompany
wĒ or yā when the referent is already in joint attention, but
additional attention needs to be brought to it, as in emotional
evaluations. Example (25) is taken from an explanation of the
Bible episode where Jesus preaches in a synagogue in Nazareth,
the town where he grew up. The Jews present in the synagogue
know him well and are surprised that the “gracious” words are
said by a man of such modest descent—the son of Joseph and
Mary. Note that everyone is already attending to Jesus (“the
eyes of everyone in the synagogue were fastened on him,” Luke
4:20, NIV). The attention management marker that the prayer
leader employs in his explanation of the situation is used in
the expression of surprise—similar to the emphatic use studied
by Levinson (2004)—rather than to overcome the difficulty of
attention alignment6.
(25)
mí tÉ wĒ, ŋ̀ŋ́g~ ć Josef gbē
person:H ATT DEM1 isn’t.it Joseph son
lÉ wāā, ŋ̀ŋ́g~ ć Marie gbē lÉ ō!
ATT DEM1 isn’t.it Mary son ATT INJ
6The same attention management marker is also used to form focus constructions
(see ex. 9, was it SOMEONE who told you, or you made it up?). On the relationship
between attention management and focus, see Khachaturyan and Ozerov (in
preparation).
TABLE 2 | Semantics of Mano demonstratives.
yā DEM
wĒ DEM, within speaker’s engagement sphere
t `c̄c DEM, attention drawing
d~ì ~̄a DEM, attention drawing, outside speaker’s engagement sphere
“That person, isn’t he JOSEPH’S SON, isn’t he MARY’S SON!”
[MOC].
Thus, being-part-of-common-ground is not an invariant
meaning of wĒ and yā, despite its frequent occurrence in natural
demonstrative use. Instead, these demonstratives can be argued
to have a general indicating function, DEM (Enfield, 2003).
The use of a demonstrative in that function “presupposes that
an addressee can know what it is referring to” (Enfield, 2003,
p. 86). In contrast, t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a, in addition to the indicating
function, have the semantic function of drawing attention to
a non-trivial referent. That wĒ and yā are often used to
indicate that the referent is part of the common ground is a
pragmatic inference (Levinson, 2000): “the use of a semantically
less specific or “weaker” form (given that a semantically more
specific or “stronger” form is an option in the same grammatical
context) implies the converse of the stronger form, yet without
semantically encoding it” (Enfield, 2003, p. 86). In other words,
because the speaker chooses not to use the semantically specific
attention-drawing markers t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a, the addressee infers that
extra work of attention alignment is not needed and that the
referent is likely already available to her by virtue of the common
ground she shares with the speaker. Yet, the inference can be
overridden by an explicit use of the attention drawing marker
lÉ. Table 2 summarizes the invariant semantics of the four Mano
demonstratives from the least to the most specific.
COMMON GROUND AND REFERENCE
RESOLUTION IN INTERACTION
Common Ground and Interactional
History
A further layer of complexity arises when referential acts are
seen not in isolation but as embedded in interactional sequences.
As interaction unfolds within a given encounter and across
encounters, more knowledge about referents, including those
present at the interactive scene, becomes mutually available to
the participants. The simplest case of mutual knowledge built
in interaction and indexed by a demonstrative is anaphora.
Indeed, the demonstratives yā and wĒ, which are commonly
used for reference tracking in monological texts (see section
“Anaphora”), are also used in conversations for reference tracking
across speech turns. In 26, the two interaction participants
are engaged in cooking. In (26.1) the speaker A draws her
addressee’s attention to the fish, which has a lot of bones.
As joint attention is established, the speaker B uses yāā
in the anaphoric function to confirm and elaborate on A’s
observation (26.2).
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(26)
(26.1) Speaker A kp~à ~á t c̀c̄, gÉnÉ lāā
fish DEM.ATT bone 3SG.EXI>3SG
yí tōŋ̄tōŋ̄ ká ō
in too.much with INJ
“This fish, there are too many bones in it!”
(26.2) Speaker B gÉnÉ yāā lāā yí
bone DEM2 3SG.EXI>3SG in
ē kélékélé ká
3SG.REFL small.PL with
“Those bones, they’re all small in it. [MOC]”
Example 26 is a “lean” case, where knowledge about
referents is available from the interaction setting and discourse
immediately preceding the use of the demonstratives. Section
“Recognitional Function” presented further cases where some
already available mutual knowledge was necessary for referent
identification. The next three examples illustrate cases where
referent identification is based on mutual knowledge which is
assumed by the speaker but negotiated in interaction.
In (27), a woman (Speaker A) is helping her sister-in-law
(Sister B) cook a festival dish, namely rice with mixed protein,
fish and duck. Poulty is a more typical protein to be put in such a
dish, so Speaker A is surprised they are adding fish and assumes
that Speaker B is doing so to offer some food to her mother, who
residing in a village called Gou and is known to be a fish lover.
And yet it was another person who asked to prepare the fish. The
person was first identified by Speaker B as “that woman” with the
ā demonstrative (a variant of yā) in the recognitional function
(27.4), and then Speaker A made sure they are talking about the
same person by using a proper name, Maria (27.5).
(27)
(27.1) Speaker A òó gèē zénı̄í kā
3PL.NEG>3SG say again 1PL.EXI
ló-pÈl̀E Gúù kÈÈ?
go-INF Gou isn’t.it
“Don’t they say you are going to
Gou?”





(27.3) Speaker A dēŋ̀ là kp~à ~á l̄E yı̄?
who 3SG.POSS fish COP there
“Whose fish is it?”
(27.4) Speaker B léé ā
woman DEM2
“That woman”
(27.5) Speaker A Màrìà?
“Maria?”
(27.6) Speaker B ŋ̀ŋ̀
“Yes”
(27.7) Speaker A l̀EÉ wìì áèlèè?
3SG.NEG meat eat.Q
“She doesn’t eat meat?”
(27.8) Speaker B ŋ̀ŋ̀
“Yes”
In addition to mutual knowledge, the engagement sphere
factor structures local interactions, where a personal concern
is put on the table and then taken up by the addressee
as shared or, in contrast, a shared concern is projected
and then recognized and validated by the addressee as
hers. The next two examples illustrate that. In the elicited
example (28) the speaker presents a referent as an object
of his personal concerns and uses the demonstrative wĒ,
which encodes the speaker’s engagement area, while the
addressee, ratifying the shared recognizability and at the
same time conveying some additional information, uses the
demonstrative yā.
(28)
(28.1) Speaker A ŋ̀ŋ́ yí d c̄
1SG.NEG>3SG interior know
ékĒá g ~c̄ wĒ
if man DEM1
lÉÈ lō nū-à zèē
3SG.IPFV go:IPFV come-GER here
ā.
BKGR
“I don’t know whether this guy
(I am expecting) is going to come.”
(28.2) Speaker B g ~c̄ yā ē nū zèē
man.H DEM1 3SG.PST come here
“The man came.” [el.]
In (29), the sequence is inverse. The two speakers chat
about several things, including a small eggplant plantation of
one of their relatives, which keeps an elderly aunt of Speaker
A busy (who is also the mother-in-law of Speaker B). By
using the demonstrative yā and framing the issue as shared
knowledge (29.1), A attempts to elicit a confirmation from her
interlocutor that she follows what is being talked about. She
receives feedback with the demonstrative wĒ, which indexes
that the speaker recognizes the referent and includes it into her
personal sphere (29.2).
(29)
(29.1) Speaker A G ćníá là k ćnĒ
auntie[FR] Gonia 3SG.POSS eggplant
ŋw ć yā kÈlÉÈ
problem:CSTR DEM2 isn’t.it
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“It’s that eggplant business of the
auntie from Gonia that did it (so that
the old woman is busy in the field),
isn’t it? That garden business of
hers?”




“this garden business of hers”
[MOC]
Common Ground and Social Fields
The previous section illustrates that a typical referential act is
embedded in an interactional sequence of reference resolution.
At the same time it is embedded in the longer-term history
of interaction between the given participants, allowing them to
have access to mutual knowledge. Referential acts are also part
of partially scripted social activities taking place in social fields
where participants occupy particular positions with relations
of power and reciprocity. As argued by Hanks, because of
this embeddedness, the interactive space defined by deixis is
“invested with much more specific values and relationships
whose interpretation turns not on deixis,” but on a particular field
(Hanks, 2005, p. 194). In particular, there is often domain-specific
knowledge involved that the participants share even when a
particular group of interactants has never communicated before.
The following example is an excerpt from a highly scripted
type of discourse, a benediction ritual which is part of a
traditional name-giving ceremony. The speaker, a classificatory
nephew performing the benediction, utters a sequence of
blessings to a newborn boy framed in the conjunctive verbal
form (“let him be such,” “let such a thing happen to him”).
The public responds by repeating the end of each token phrase
of the benediction in the habitualis form (“he is such,” “such
a thing happens to him”). The speaker refers to two abstract
qualities (growing force, good intelligence) and one physical
(a shining thing between the thighs, meaning well-functioning
reproductive organs). Crucially, he refers to all three with the
wĒ demonstrative because these are typical things to wish to
a boy. The consistent use of the same demonstrative and the
same tense forms endows the interaction with a rhythmical,
routinized structure characteristic of the ritual context. At the
same time, given that the boy is also present during the ritual, the
reference to these qualities—especially the physical one—has an
exophoric dimension.
(30)
benediction ı̄ fàŋá wĒ é tÈnÈ!
2SG force DEM1 3sg.conj climb




benediction ı̄ kílí yı̄è wĒ é
2SG intelligence good DEM1 3SG.CONJ
nū!
come




benediction nàá, mā gèē g~ c̀ lÉ ı̄
man 1SG.PST>3SG say man.H ATT 2SG
ká, nàá, mā gèē,
with man 1SG.PST>3SG say
ı̄ gb ~á ~á fÈŋ́ wĒ é áí!
2SG thigh between DEM1 3sg.conj shine
“man, I said, you are a boy, man, I said, let




In some cases, the use of the demonstratives wĒ and yā
does not only index the common ground and the routinized
properties of interactions in a particular field, but also contributes
to shape the context of interaction as a distinct social field
with a presupposition of shared knowledge. Thus, in oral Bible
translations as they are performed by Mano priests and prayer
leaders, many noun phrases contain the demonstratives wĒ and
yā. They are often used in first mentions of objects and places
beyond the utterance context and perform the recognitional
function. Many of these referents, however, are fairly exotic
and cannot be assumed to be known by the community of
Mano Catholics, such as the Horeb mountain in (31). Instead of
indexing the shared knowledge of the referents in question, these
deictic markers project it in a performative fashion. Because of
the dialogic orientation of recognitional deixis, as a consequence
of projection of recognizability, the speaker (a ritual specialist)
and the addressees (the congregation) emerge as knowledge-
sharing co-insiders. This, in turn, contributes to a performative
creation of a community of co-insiders—a religious community
sharing religious knowledge (Khachaturyan, 2019).
(31)
ē nū là tòlòpÈ v ć yā
3SG.PST come 3SG.POSS domestic.animal PL DEM2
ká yÈí kpóŋ́ yā
with savannah border DEM2
yí Horeb, ~́E ~́E ē kĒ wálà là t ć̀ŋ
in Horeb and 3SG.PST be God 3SG.POSS mountain
yāā ŋwíí ká.
DEM2 top with
“He came with those domestic animals of his at that border
of the savannah, at Horeb, that was a top of that mountain of
God’s.”
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French source: “Il mena le troupeau au-delà du désert et
parvint à la montagne de Dieu, à l’Horeb.”
NIV: “... and he led the flock to the far side of the wilderness
and came to Horeb, the mountain of God.”
Both (30) and (31) are examples of language use with an
unusual participation framework where the speaker is a ritual
specialist. Everyday family and village life is no less scripted
than the fields of religious practice and is filled with routinized
activities. It is the position of the wife of the elder brother
that allows the speaker in (15) to give orders to her brother-
in-law with minimal referential expressions (“do the thing with
the fire”). Similarly, the seller of popcorn balls recurs to a
recognizable marketing formula, “buy these X of yours” (2).
DISCUSSION
The relation of proximity is a function of the natural and social
carving of the physical space. Such spatial divisions contribute to
forming the notion of wider physical accessibility, which accounts
for the use of speaker- or addressee-anchored forms (Burenhult,
2018). Furthermore, proximity is in certain cases a function of
the bodily engagement of the interlocutors with the object and
physical access to it. The notion of peripersonal space, which can
be extended if the speaker uses tools (such as a stick) is in certain
languages a better predictor of the choice of the demonstrative
form than exact distance (Coventry et al., 2008).
As shown in examples (4) and (5) from Mano, however, the
referent located at a similar distance outside the peripersonal
space (about 2–3 m) may be framed with the marker d~ì ~̄a if the
speaker intends to physically engage with the object but cannot
reach it, or with the proximal marker t c̀c̄if mere pointing and
identification is enough for the current purposes. If the speaker
is busy with some chores and her hands are occupied, so that
she cannot point (15) or if the addressee is busy with some tasks
and cannot attend to pointing gestures (2), his attention can be
called for by framing the referent as if it was invisible. Thus, the
purpose of referent identification and the activity which it is part
of motivate the choice of deictic marker. The engagement area,
which is defined as “the place which is, at moment t, the conceived
site of a person’s currently dominant manual and attentional
engagement” (Enfield, 2003, p. 89) and which shifts depending
on the interactional setting and the interlocutor’s current activity,
matters for the choice of demonstrative reference sometimes
more than physical distance per se. In Mano, the engagement
area contrasts the demonstratives t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a, where the latter
is situated outside the engagement area and the former is neutral
in that regard. Engagement in a more abstract sense as an area
of one’s ownership, control, or concern appears to contrast the
markers yā and wĒ, where the latter marks objects within the
speaker’s engagement area and the former is neutral.
Attention focus management as an evolving interactive
process which gets reflected by the choice of the demonstrative
form has been recognized in much recent literature.
A particularly well-known case is Turkish, mentioned in
section “Introduction.” In Jahai, the addressee-centered marker
ton is used when the addressee’s attention is already focused on
the referent (Burenhult, 2003). Tiriyó is another language where
the addressee’s attention focus, not physical distance, influences
the choice between (two proximal) markers (Meira, 2018). In
Mano, the demonstrative d~ì ~̄a is always used with a marker of
attention alignment lÉ or tÉ. While the demonstrative t c̀c̄never
combines with such a marker, it likely derives historically from
a merger with tÉ. Rather than a means to express attention
alignment across attempts at securing the addressee’s attention
focus, the function common to both demonstratives is to
underscore that the addressee needs to do some extra work to
identify the referent; here, pointing at visible objects which often
accompanies t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a is a means to secure attention.
Demonstratives wĒ and yā can also be used with the attention
alignment markers lÉ and tÉ when there is some difficulty
in referent identification (God speaking from a cloud and
hence not being able to point) or there is some emphatic
attention alignment. Thus, while t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a can be characterized
as +ATTENTION ALIGNMENT, wĒ and yā are not -ATTENTION
ALIGNMENT, but rather neutral and have the most general
indicating function proper to demonstratives as a class (Enfield,
2003) as their primary meaning. Yet, in speech events they
are often interpreted as marking referents that do not require
additional attention alignment as they are already part of the
common ground of the interlocutors. This interpretation arises
from a pragmatic inference whereby the use of a semantically
weaker term implies the opposite of the semantically stronger
term that the speaker chose not to use. A similar contrast
between a general indicating demonstrative and a demonstrative
that indexes referents which require additional coordination
between the speaker and the addressee is also attested in Yurakaré
(Gipper, 2017).
The pragmatic function of the demonstratives wĒ and yā
of marking common ground in reference to objects present at
the interactive scene is very frequently observed in interaction.
Because these demonstratives do not have visual attention
alignment as a necessary component of their semantics, wĒ and
yā are used in a variety of endophoric functions. Moreover,
the markers wĒ and yā grammaticalize into generalized clause-
final markers used explicitly to mark backgrounded information.
Thus, wĒ is also used in imperative clauses when the request
or invitation is highly expected in the given context (see also
the utterance final wĒ in 2 and 13); both wĒ and yā are
used as subordinate clause markers (see examples 8 and 10;
Khachaturyan, 2018b).
The interlocutors’ common ground is difficult to assess in
experimental settings and is much more rarely discussed as a
parameter for the demonstrative choice. And yet it seems to be
more basic than some other interactional parameters discussed
in the literature. In particular, it often underlies the rationale for
the choice of demonstrative for invisible referents and overrules
the visibility parameter per se, as in Yélî Dnye (Levinson, 2005,
2018). Common ground seems to be a contrast for the “invisible”
forms in Quileute (Andrade, 1933), where one set of markers
denotes referents which are known to the addressee and another
the referents which are known to both parties. It is because the
referents are cognitively accessible that they are identifiable while
being invisible. (In)visibility per se is not encoded in Mano but is
a contextual factor that favors the use of the demonstratives wĒ
or yā that do not encode the attention coordination function and
can be used to mark invisible, but cognitively available referents.
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The way attentional and common ground distinctions are
mapped into demonstrative systems varies from language to
language. In Jahai, the same marker ton is used to confirm
mutual attention to a referent, as well as in cases where referents
form part of the common ground and for anaphoric reference
(Burenhult, 2003). In Tiriyó, the marker used for referents already
attended to can be used only for exophoric, and never for
anaphoric reference (Meira, 2018). In Yélî Dnye, the common
ground marker is used in the recognitional function, but not for
anaphora, for which a dedicated marker exists (Levinson, 2018).
In Yucatec Maya, the same non-immediate enclitic is used for
recognitional and for anaphoric reference, as well as in exophoric
uses where common ground is involved, but the contrast between
the functions is expressed by a proclitic (Hanks, 2005). Finally, in
Mano, the demonstratives wĒ and yā cover all functions in the
endophoric domain and are used for exophoric-cum-endophoric
reference when common ground appears to matter.
Common ground arises from interactional history and
broader cultural knowledge. On the one hand, any referential act
in natural language use is part of an interactional sequence and
interactional history involving the current interlocutors. On the
other hand, it belongs to the domain of social action occurring in
social fields that endow the interlocutors with social roles. This
double embedding (in terms of Hanks, 2005) makes referents
mutually known to the interlocutors, and therefore, cognitively
available and anticipated. Thus, cognitive accessibility becomes
one of the factors determining the choice of a deictic marker
in exophoric reference. In Yucatec Maya, it is likely the shared
interactional history, which is responsible for the routinized
nature of certain types of interactions, such as greetings or
scoldings, that triggers the choice of the non-immediate deictic
over the immediate deictic in speaker-proximal settings (Hanks,
1990, 2005). In Mano, the demonstratives wĒ and yā are
systematically used to mark referents in particular routinized
speech genres, such as benedictions.
An additional complication regarding common ground is that
it is not a fixed artifact: it can be creatively shaped by individuals
and negotiated in interaction. Wrongly assuming common
ground may lead to failures in recipient design (Deppermann,
2015) and additional interactional work in referent identification
(Khachaturyan, 2019). Creative common ground management
may become a feature of certain registers, as I show in the
example of the Catholic register, where the use of demonstratives
frames some referents as known to the congregation, while
there are reasons to doubt their universal recognizability. This
register feature arguably has broader consequences for shaping
the interactional context, since it concomitantly shapes the
addressees, the Catholic congregation, as a community of
knowledge-sharing co-insiders.
CONCLUSION
This paper is a first-hand ethnographic account of demonstrative
reference in an under described language, Mano (Mande).
It argues that in exophoric reference, the Mano demonstratives
t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a are contrasted with the demonstratives wĒ and
yā in that the former index referents that require attention
coordination for referent identification. In contrast, wĒ and yā
are commonly interpreted, as a result of pragmatic inference, as
the opposite of t c̀c̄and d~ì ~̄a and index referents that do not require
attention coordination being part of the common ground. They
do not semantically encode common ground, however, having a
more general referent identification function as their invariant
semantics (Enfield, 2003; Gipper, 2017).
Common ground, including mutual knowledge of the
referents, cannot be accounted for unless one studies
demonstrative reference in natural use. Indeed, referential
acts are part, first, of the immediate interactional sequence of
referent identification and negotiation (Küntay and Özyürek,
2006), and second, in long-term interactional history involving
given participants (Deppermann, 2018; Harjunpää et al., 2021).
A further layer is the embeddedness of referential acts into the
fabric of social action within particular social fields (Hanks, 2005).
All these levels provide speech act participants with knowledge
about referents which enable referent identification for objects
both within and outside the interactive space. Thus, as argued
by Agha (1996), Burenhult (2003), and most prominently Hanks
(2005, 2011), cognitive access to referents functions alongside
of perceptual access, which includes, but is not restricted to,
spatial (visual) access. The centrality of common ground in
reference to the objects at the interactive scene challenges the
often assumed classification of demonstrative reference into
exophoric and endophoric and, as a logical consequence of this,
the primacy of exophoric reference at the level of the actual
referential practice.
This article adds another argument in favor of viewing
demonstrative reference as a social, interactive process (Peeters
and Özyürek, 2016). It contributes to the empirical studies of
(demonstrative) reference by bringing together the interactionist
perspective and the sociological concept of field (Hanks,
2005) and by drawing on examples from distinct social
domains of interaction, including everyday conversations
and ritual discourse. The lack of a theoretical framework
that would articulate the interlocking of interactional space,
interactional history and social fields is a major shortcoming
of this paper. A promising line of research which would
support the development of such a framework would be a
longitudinal study of (language) socialization within particular
fields—how do people come to inhabit their social roles,
know what they know and how is this process reflected in
referential practice?
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